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Abstract
Licensing is currently the most popular option among regulators for controlling gambling opera-
tions. However, approximately 20% of operators are still public monopolies. Many forms of
gambling (especially lotteries) are government operated even in countries with a licensing system.
This creates an inherent conflict of interest, given that government is supposed to protect the well-
being of its citizenry and to reap the benefits of gambling at the same time. At least in the gambling
monopoly, however, addressing the unavoidable harm that results from gambling should be a
priority. Industry self-regulation and reliance on “responsible gambling” rely too much on indi-
viduals to control their own gambling. It is suggested in this contribution that it is possible to
provide more comprehensive consumer protection, recognising both the duty of governments to
take care of their own citizens and the fact that industry self-regulation is not enough. Pre-
commitment cards have been tested in various contexts, and have shown promise in terms of
providing tools for individuals to restrict their own gambling. However, given the known short-
comings such as allowing the use of other cards that are not one’s own, and other venues, it is clear
that in themselves they do not guarantee effective prevention. Personal licensing is therefore
explored as a move forward in this literature-based discussion. Although the system may be
applicable to other contexts, the focus is on the Nordic countries. Given that the underlying
justification for gambling monopolies is to control gambling-related harm, in the cases of Finland
and Norway licensing could be combined with loyalty cards introduced by monopoly operators.
This would provide a feasible alternative to current practices of responsible gambling.
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The purpose of gambling regulation is to ensure
public confidence in gambling and to protect
customers (Gambling Commission, 2017).
Gambling is often promoted as harmless enter-
tainment and a (partial) solution to the financ-
ing problems of welfare states, but in reality it is
unclear what its net benefit is for European
societies (Egerer, Marionneau, & Nikkinen,
2018). Economic and fiscal impacts may be
modest and short-term, and they may depend
on the jurisdiction (Walker & Sobel, 2016).
Merely adding jobs to a certain community may
not enhance well-being: in gambling as
throughout the hospitality industry, jobs offered
by operators tend to be part-time, underpaid,
demanding less education, and to require shift
work, especially at night, thus increasing the
need for round-the-clock childcare especially
in single-parent households (Grinols, 2004).
Introducing new gambling opportunities does
not necessarily generate additional revenue for
operators and beneficiaries either, in that the
games may cannibalise what is already on offer
(Marionneau & Nikkinen, 2018). Even the reg-
ulators struggle to understand what the overall
derived value is, particularly in the case of elec-
tronic gambling machines (EGMs) (Francis,
Livingstone, & Rintoul, 2017).
Gambling generates a significant amount of
harm, and problem gambling is a recognised
public-health issue (Ferentzy & Turner, 2013;
Lancet, 2017). It is estimated that up to ten
million people could be categorised as gam-
bling addicts in the European Union alone (Jen-
sen, 2017). It is also claimed that each gambling
addict inflicts harm upon between five and 17
other people (Sulkunen et al., in press). In Fin-
land, a country with a population of 5.5 million,
this would affect 700,000 people (MSAH,
2017). Gambling-related harm is not limited
to health issues, however. Online gambling cre-
ates opportunities for money laundering (Fie-
dler, 2014), for example, and increases in
problem gambling lead to a higher probability
of criminal activity (Grinols, 2017). Gambling
is also linked to corruption in public adminis-
tration. Douglas Walker and Paul Calcagno
(2014) found in their empirical study evaluating
federal corruption cases in all 50 US states, that
the five states with the lowest levels of public
corruption had no casinos. Moreover, only one
of the five states with the most corruption cases
related to civil servants did not have any casi-
nos: this was Alaska, the state in which political
corruption has related more closely to the oil
industry.
Licensing is currently the most popular
means among regulators of controlling gam-
bling operations within a certain jurisdiction
(Nikkinen, 2014). Approximately 20% of gam-
bling operators are public monopolies (Sulku-
nen et al., in press). Two main arguments for
legalising gambling have been put forward:
legalisation stops crime and fraud, and (illegal)
online gambling cannot be controlled. It is
worth noting, however, that illegal gambling
also exists in countries with public gambling
monopolies. Sweden, for example, has thou-
sands of illegal gambling machines that are not
controlled by the government (Svenska Spel,
2014). It is also possible to control online gam-
bling via payment blocking, as happens in
Norway, meaning that banks and other financial
institutions are not allowed to process gambling
payments to unauthorised operators (Rossow &
Hansen, 2016). IP blocking of websites owned
by unlicensed gambling operators is also prac-
tised in Denmark. Furthermore, Germany and
the United States have imposed a general ban
on online sports betting (Reiche, 2013).
Although this is changing in the US following
court decisions made in 2018, it shows that it is
possible to influence the availability of online
gambling provided that there is enough political
will to impose bans.
Given that there are the means available for
effective restriction, it is more a question of
what it is feasible to prohibit or restrict in lib-
eral countries. To be more specific, one might
ask what the government’s proper role in gam-
bling is, a question that John Dombrink (2009)
also raised in the US context. Is it to control, to
regulate, to promote or to facilitate gambling?
These questions reflect varying approaches to
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the complex issue of how to regulate and con-
trol coercive commodities, given that much of
their consumption is involuntary (Young &
Markham, 2017). The fact that the government
is both the operator and the regulator in a gam-
bling monopoly creates an inherent conflict of
interest, as has been shown in various contexts
across the globe (Adams, 2016; Andresen,
2006; Markham & Young, 2015; Orford,
2011; Smith & Rubenstein, 2011). The problem
for governments that are increasingly depen-
dent on gambling in the financing of public
services seems to be that the efficient preven-
tion of gambling problems may also decrease
profits (Andresen, 2006; Collier, 2013; Rossow
& Hansen, 2015; Williams, West, & Simpson,
2012). The reason for this is that much of the
gambling revenue is derived from problem
gamblers (e.g., Orford, Wardle, & Griffiths,
2013; Williams & Wood, 2004, 2007), and thus
diminishing problem gambling leads also to a
decrease in government revenue (see Williams
& Wood, 2016 for further information and
references).
If it is accepted that it is a governmental duty
to protect citizens from gambling-related harm
(even though it might have negative impact on
state revenue), individual prevention measures
could be introduced such as a mandatory pre-
commitment card, as used in Norway and is
being recommended for adoption in Australia
in relation to electronic gambling machines, or
EGMs (Rintoul & Thomas, 2017). This pre-
commitment card could be developed further
as a licence granted to individual gamblers,
which would be a step towards the more effi-
cient prevention of gambling-related harm.
This article assesses the option of licensing for
more effective control and regulation, instead
of promoting and facilitating gambling. Given
that this is a literature-based study, no empirical
material is analysed: the aim is rather to point
out possible alternatives to the current (domi-
nant) notion of “responsible gambling”. The
reasoning relates to the fact that there are no
clear-cut definitions of what is “responsible”
as opposed to “excessive” gambling. This being
the case, one should err on the side of more
effective consumer protection to facilitate the
prevention of gambling problems before they
occur.
Problem gambling and pre-
commitment: What is the
relationship?
Problem gambling is a phenomenon that occurs
when time and/or money spent on gambling
leads to negative consequences. Although there
is no universally accepted definition of the phe-
nomenon, according to Erica Langham and her
colleagues it incorporates at least seven
domains: financial issues, relationship issues,
psychological distress, decrements to health,
cultural harm, workplace problems and crimin-
ality (Langham et al., 2016). Gambling-related
harm is understood in this article along broadly
the same lines. In their efforts to tackle this
issue, especially in relation to EGMs, countries
such as Sweden and Norway, certain states in
Australia and a province in Canada (Nova
Scotia, a trial only) have introduced various
pre-commitment systems (Ladouceur, Blas-
zczynski, & Lalande, 2012). In Finland, over
40% of the adult population currently have a
Veikkaus (national monopoly operator, in addi-
tion to PAF in Åland) loyalty card, paving the
way for the more efficient prevention of
gambling-related harm through the monitoring
of individual gambling habits.
Australia is the country that has perhaps
given most attention to pre-commitment (Pro-
ductivity Commission, 1999, 2010). In 2010 the
Productivity Commission recommended those
concerned about gambling-related harm to be
more effective in implementing pre-
commitment technologies, and mandatory pre-
commitment was planned for the year 2014.
However, this was merely a promise made by
then Prime Minister Julia Gillard to indepen-
dent (Tasmanian) MP Andrew Wilkie in return
for his political support, and the plan was aban-
doned later. Opposition from the gambling
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industry may well have influenced the decision
(Livingstone, Rintoul, & Francis, 2014). Nor-
way has been the most effective in implement-
ing mandatory pre-commitment loss limits: the
maximum monthly loss from all gambling
through one of the two monopoly operators
(Norsk Tipping, monopoly for lottery, sports
and other gambling besides tote betting) is
NOK 20,000 (approximately EUR 2,000). This
mandatory limit-setting reduced the revenue of
Norsk Tipping by NOK 150 million (approxi-
mately EUR 16 million) after its introduction in
2016 (Lyngøy, 2017), but according to the most
recent Annual Report (2017: Norsk Tipping,
2018) profits are steadily increasing again. In
any case, given that the annual revenue of
Norsk Tipping is close to NOK 5,000 million
(approximately EUR 500 million) the reduction
in 2016 was modest, and the impact might not
be long-lasting. Nevertheless, together with a
reduction in EGM numbers and the conse-
quently lower addiction potential, it may be a
move in the right direction in terms of addres-
sing gambling-related harm. The fact that gam-
blers viewed the limitations positively and only
a few switched to other operators after the man-
datory limit-setting supports this conclusion
(Auer, Reiestad, & Griffiths, 2018).
In principle, the idea underlying pre-
commitment is simple: decisions related to
gambling expenditure should be made non-
emotionally, and once the decision has been
made it should be followed (Ladouceur et al.,
2012). Thus, it is a mechanism for overcoming
impulsivity (Kurth-Nelson & Redish, 2012).
The benefit of pre-commitment for individual
gamblers is that they are in a better position to
evaluate the cost of gambling beforehand. The
nature of gambling as a form of entertainment is
such that it resembles a service, and it is diffi-
cult to specify what, exactly, is being bought.
Even if one accepts the notion that (intangible)
dreams of winning and one’s imagination pro-
vide the entertainment value of gambling, and
this is what the consumer pays for, the fact
remains that spending money is an integral and
unavoidable part of the activity. Many other
forms of entertainment do not require the con-
stant use of money, and the consumer knows
the price beforehand, in other words before
entering the venue in which the entertainment
is provided. The cost of a movie ticket is known
when the customer enters the cinema, for exam-
ple, and similarly, the cost of watching a game
of football, rugby or ice hockey is known when
the ticket is bought. In some cases, the enter-
tainment may be totally free (e.g., a concert in a
public park).
In the case of gambling, however, the cost of
the entertainment may be difficult to assess,
which makes it difficult to evaluate other lei-
sure options and thus the opportunity cost of
gambling. Gamblers may initially (seemingly)
decide rationally what they will consume, but
“in the zone” (in a different state of mind when
gambling) they may lose control of their con-
sumption (Schull, 2012). Problem gamblers in
particular tend to withdraw additional funds
from ATMs, gamble away their winnings, and
then try to recover their lost assets. Pre-
commitment limits consumption, and it is this
capacity that has led to its implementation and
testing in several countries and states (such as
the US state of Massachusetts) as a responsible
gambling tool, despite the rather limited evi-
dence base at present (Ladouceur, Shaffer,
Blaszczynski, & Shaffer, 2017). Moreover,
given that many gamblers with a gambling dis-
order recover without professional help, pre-
commitment is also a suitable self-help tool
(Harris & Griffiths, 2017). This, to some extent,
explains its popularity among those who favour
measures to encourage “responsible” gambling.
Current forms of pre-commitment may be
voluntary or involuntary, and players may limit
the time or the money spent at the venue. This
limit-setting takes various forms (Thomas,
Christensen, et al., 2016), depending on the
pre-commitment system. Full pre-commitment
requires registration by all those who intend to
gamble, whereas partial pre-commitment
allows gambling to continue without specific
registration (the voluntary option). Both sys-
tems (full and partial) allow choice in the
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setting of limits: it may be mandatory, meaning
that all those who are in the system have to put a
limit on their gambling, or voluntary in which
case it is possible to continue gambling without
placing strict limits on consumption (Thomas,
Christensen, et al., 2016). One related and sig-
nificant aspect of pre-commitment systems is
the possibility of self-exclusion from the gam-
bling venue. Previously, this option necessi-
tated a personal visit to the venue to
implement the system, but nowadays it is
increasingly common to use electronic means
(Thomas, Carson, et al., 2016). The breaching
of self-exclusion is common in Australia,
Canada and the USA; however, given that
venues tend to rely on self-enforcement and
manual recognition by the staff of those who
have self-excluded. The general obligation to
prove one’s identity when entering gambling
venues in Europe makes self-exclusion more
efficient (Livingstone et al., 2014). However,
in practice it is often circumvented by merely
changing the gambling venue or continuing on
an internet site. This is not such a big issue in
the case of casino gambling in the Nordic coun-
ties, where much of the brick-and-mortar gam-
bling is still provided by government-owned
gambling operators, because no other casinos
may be available. However, there is clearly a
need for additional measures addressing the
issue of gambling-related harm other than rely-
ing on self-exclusion and on individuals to con-
trol their own gambling. Most of those who
exceed their limits are problem gamblers
(Ladouceur et al., 2017, with reference to Hing
et al., 2015).
Problems with pre-commitment
Various problems are associated with the use of
pre-commitment systems. First, the quality of
research addressing the issue is not particularly
high, which makes it difficult to evaluate the
usefulness of such systems and the efficacy of
the various measures they include. Ladouceur
et al. conducted a literature review in 2012,
browsing empirical works dealing with the
issue of pre-commitment. They identified 17
relevant academic publications, in addition to
non-peer-reviewed governmental reports.
Many of the 17 publications had severe meth-
odological limitations, thus hindering evalua-
tion of the measures adopted. The limitations
included small and unrepresentative sample
sizes, the inability to control for other gambling
expenditure (apart from that occurring in the
trial), high reliance on self-reporting and card
swapping (gambling with pre-commitment
cards other than the one assigned for use in the
trial). A more recent review conducted by a
team including the same two authors did not
identify much new research that was not avail-
able earlier (Ladouceur et al., 2017). Andrew
Harris and Mark Griffiths included pre-
commitment in their review published in
2017: they note that mandatory limit-setting
in Norway has helped gamblers to adhere to
their limits (Harris & Griffiths, 2017).
Another issue with pre-commitment relates
to the lack of universality in implementation: in
many states and countries, including Norway
where it is still possible to gamble via foreign
internet operators, neither the loyalty card nor
any other card required for pre-commitment
covers all or even most of the available gam-
bling forms (Ladouceur et al., 2012; Living-
stone et al., 2014). Participants may continue
gambling through other channels if the pre-
commitment limit agreed with one specific
operator or gambling venue has already been
reached. Furthermore, Ladouceur and his
colleagues question the efficacy of pre-
commitment in tackling problem gambling in
that problem gamblers may set higher limits
than others. However, according to Livingstone
and others (Livingstone et al., 2014) this may
be a slight misinterpretation of the underlying
findings because the study to which Ladouceur
et al. (2012) refer (Schlotter Consulting, 2010)
shows only that gamblers set higher limits when
they are not in the gambling venue.
Third, private operators in jurisdictions in
which there is no national gambling monopoly
will store and process information related to
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pre-commitment. The technology providers are
also privately owned, which raises some con-
cerns about the protection of personal informa-
tion. Nevertheless, private companies in the
field of finance routinely collect personal data,
record receipts for government to use for taxa-
tion purposes and monitor internet and mobile-
phone traffic, for example. Moreover, private
healthcare providers store large amounts of
highly sensitive personal information to which
governments have no access. Thus, pre-
commitment technology in itself does not differ
markedly from the aforementioned practices
(Banks, 2011). It could therefore be assumed
that the problems associated with pre-
commitment would not, as such, prevent the
development of an efficient licensing system
based on it.
Licensing
To facilitate the more effective prevention of
gambling-related harm, consideration could be
given to introducing a licence that covers all
gambling, similar to a driving licence or a per-
mit to carry a weapon. Among the proponents
of such a course of action are Edward A. Morse
and Ernest P. Goss in their book Governing
fortune: Casino gambling in America (Morse
& Goss, 2010). The concept of licensing is
already recognised as a regulatory tool for con-
trolling gambling companies and operations,
but Morse and Goss propose that it should also
apply to individuals. One reason for licensing
gambling, according to W. A. Bogart (2011), is
that there are already numerous areas in modern
societies requiring a certain standard of compe-
tence and/or knowledge to lawfully engage in
certain activities (plumbing and the law being
prominent examples). Morse and Goss also
point out that there is a historical precedent with
regard to gambling: the state of Nevada in the
USA passed a law in 1877 prohibiting gambling
by those in debt and men with a family to sup-
port (Bogart, 2011; Morse & Goss, 2010). In
these more modern times, many gambling
venues across the globe require photographic
ID upon entry, and Nordic countries such as
Norway and Sweden are forerunners in adopt-
ing technology that requires customers to iden-
tify themselves before being allowed to gamble
(Williams, 2010). Electronic ID cards further
enhance the capacity to recognise individual
gamblers, complementing (or replacing) the use
of online bank-account codes. The Nordic
countries could therefore provide a suitable
testing ground for this kind of licensing.
Further benefits of requiring a license to
gamble include the fact that it could be revoked
in case of misuse. It would also facilitate age
control, given that licences are generally issued
to adults. A licensing system could also require
gamblers to understand the odds of winning
beforehand. In the case of EGM gambling, for
example, many gamblers claim that the amount
they will win is consistent with the advertised
return to player (RTP) ratio (AGRC, 2017),
which is between 85% and 87% in Australia,
and between 90% and 95% in Finland depend-
ing on the EGM. However, gamblers do not
leave the EGM venue with 85 or 87 Euros in
their pocket from a stake of 100 Euros: deduc-
tion of the price factor for each bet wagered
results in a more accurate measure of the real
cost of gambling. If, say, the RTP ratio is 85%,
gamblers will lose 15% on average on each
individual gambling event (such as electronic
displays of moving the reels in an EGM “spin”).
Given that the effect is cumulative, a gambler
who places a bet of one Euro after each five
seconds will lose ten Euros in less than five
minutes (provided that the game works consis-
tently in such a short time, which is not always
the case). With a bet of five Euros for each
individual event, the same amount (ten Euros)
is lost in less than minute (AGRC, 2017).
Another often-cited misconception in this
context is the so-called gambler’s fallacy, in
other words a belief that observing an increas-
ingly long sequence of events (in an unbiased
machine or other gambling platform) will make
the occurrence of another outcome more likely
in the next trial. In coin tossing, for example,
more “heads” will somehow inevitably point to
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the occurrence of “tails” (see Farmer, Warren,
& Hahn, 2017). A theory test of the type that is
common in driving schools across the globe
could be introduced before a personal licence
to gamble is issued, the aim being to find out
whether the applicant understands the basic
facts related to gambling. The information pro-
vided by gambling venues and private gam-
bling operators is not always very helpful, or
it may be presented in a complicated manner.
The basic functionality of EGM gambling is
even difficult for those who work in the field
to understand. Moreover, losses are often dis-
guised as winnings, near-misses are misleading
and encourage more gambling that overrides
rational assessment of the situation, and the
same venue may have various EGMs with dif-
fering odds of winning, further hindering
rational decision-making and effective con-
sumer protection (Schull, 2012). Licensing
would enable clarification of both the odds of
winning, and of the fact that gambling events
are, on the whole, statistically unrelated to each
other.
It is clear that requiring a gambling license
also constrains and limits gambling opportuni-
ties among those who are not problem gam-
blers. However, lessons learned in the case of
other coercive commodities (such as alcohol,
tobacco and drugs) indicate that most effective
harm-reduction strategies also influence con-
sumption among those who do not consider
themselves “problematic” users (Williams,
2010; with reference to Williams, West, &
Simpson, 2007, 2008). The total consumption
model (TCM) has been influential in alcohol
policy and may also be applicable to gam-
bling policy (Sulkunen et al., in press; see
also Harris & Griffiths, 2017 for references).
Requiring a licence might lower the overall
level of gambling, leading to fewer problems.
It would also protect children through more
efficient age verification: in the UK, for
example, 25,000 children aged 11 to 16 qua-
lify as problem gamblers (Gambling Com-
mission, 2017). Currently it is difficult to
find a problem-gambling prevention
programme that adopts a family-focused
approach (Kourgiantakis, Stark, Lobo, & Top-
perman, 2016). Effective prevention would
require strict control of age verification, which
a licence would facilitate. Licensing might also
protect families in cases of child neglect due to
problem gambling through suspension: cur-
rently only Singapore allows families to
request the exclusion of a family member from
a gambling venue as a harm-minimisation mea-
sure (Goh, Ng, & Yeoh, 2016).
Is the level of gambling harm such
that there should be more
effective control?
Consumer freedom is deemed important in rela-
tion to gambling, given that its provision is
allowed and the activity seemingly gives per-
sonal pleasure to those who engage in it. The
prevalent presupposition in gambling studies
(and in most governmental reports on the sub-
ject) is that only a relatively small minority of
players are addicted to gambling (approxi-
mately between one and three per cent of the
populace, depending on the jurisdiction, see
Sulkunen et al., in press), hence the pleasure
of the majority is considered to cancel out the
potential harm (Nikkinen & Marionneau,
2014). However, for many people gambling is
of no significance, and most people who do
gamble only enter lotteries. According to sur-
veys and polls conducted in the UK, for exam-
ple, the general view of gambling is somewhat
negative (Orford, 2011). Moreover, 84% of the
respondents in a study conducted in Australian
Capital Territory in 2014 agreed with the state-
ment that pokies (EGMs in Australia) did more
harm than good, and more than half were in
favour of reducing the number (Davidson, Rod-
gers, Taylor-Rodgers, Suomi, & Lucas, 2015).
In Italy, all gambling advertising will be banned
from 2019 onwards by parliamentary decree.
Finland is a notable exception to the above-
mentioned examples, in that many adults view
gambling positively. However, the attitudes of
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young people are slightly more negative, indi-
cating a potential change in the future (Salonen,
Alho, & Castren, 2017).
It is also common practice for governments
to impose regulations on activities that are
hazardous to health or are potentially criminal.
Given that gambling is not an essential service,
i.e., something that governments must necessa-
rily allow or promote, effective limitation to
tackle potential harm should be a viable option.
Graphic warnings are given on cigarette pack-
ets and nutrition facts are commonplace in the
case of food items, but when it comes to
gambling-related harm empirically effective
prevention measures are frequently not imple-
mented. The capacity of the gambling industry
to defend the sale of harmful products and ser-
vices may explain the situation. In Australia,
the capacity to lobby politicians has been com-
pared to the power of the National Rifle Asso-
ciation (NRA) in the US (Baidawi, 2018;
Buzacott-Speer, 2017), and political donations
are used to resist gambling reforms (Scott &
Heath, 2016). The mere threat of being targeted
by the industry in elections may be enough for
some politicians to withdraw their support for
gambling restriction in Australia, as some com-
mentators claim (Markham & Young, 2016).
The nature of gambling-related harm is
poorly understood when it is limited to individ-
uals who qualify as experiencing severe harm,
which is a small percentage (Browne, Greer,
Rawat, & Rockloff, 2017). It was reported in
a study commissioned by the Victorian Gam-
bling Research Foundation in Australia that
85% of gambling-related harm in the state of
Victoria in the fiscal year 2014–2015 was asso-
ciated with gamblers at a low or moderate risk.
This accounted for AUD 4.3 billion as a social
cost, whereas severe problem gamblers
incurred a cost of AUD 2.36 billion within the
same period (Browne, Greer, Armstrong et al.,
2017). Most gambling harm in Australia (75%)
is associated with EGMs, but pre-commitment
is still not on the list when gambling restrictions
are proposed. Effective prevention measures
should focus on the gravest harm (i.e., resulting
from the use of EGMs) by reducing the number
of EGMs and limiting overall access to them
(Livingstone, 2018; Selin et al., 2017). Gam-
bling machines should not be allowed in gro-
cery stores and public places, where people
cannot avoid them, but should be placed in des-
ignated venues. It is not possible to self-exclude
from a grocery store, given that everyone needs
to buy food items to survive. It is not necessary,
either, for governments to allow EGMs in cafe-
terias and other retail spaces including general
food stores, supermarkets and convenience
stores that are frequented for purchasing the
necessities for daily living. The presence of the
machines gives unfair support to the enterprises
that accept gambling in their premises, com-
pared to those who for some reason are unable
or unwilling to house them.
Current regulatory schemes tend to favour
measures focused on self-regulation and indi-
vidual responsibility, which has occurred in
tandem with the de-regulation of the industry
and thus favours commercial interests. Rebecca
Cassidy et al. (2014) conclude on the basis of
interviews conducted with over 100 stake-
holders that “responsible gambling” is a politi-
cal construct, serving the interests of the state
when it aligns itself with the gambling industry.
Garry Smith and Linda Hancock (Hancock &
Smith, 2017) also criticise the so-called “Reno
model”, put forward in four academic articles
published in sequence by more or less the same
authors, advancing the idea that individual self-
control is possible in the context of gambling
(Blaszczynski et al., 2011; Blaszczynski,
Ladouceur, Nower, & Shaffer, 2008; Blas-
zczynski, Ladouceur, & Shaffer, 2004; Collins
et al., 2015). The Reno model is used both by
operators to promote responsible gambling, and
by government officials keen to reap the pro-
ceeds. The concept places the responsibility for
problems on individuals, allowing the industry
to focus on problem gamblers who show signs
of a loss of control.
Even when responsible gambling legislation
is in place, in reality it does not necessarily
provide a safe or problem-free gambling
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environment. Having conducted 225 interviews
with its employees, Linda Hancock compared
the legislation and policies in Australia that
guide responsible gambling to what actually
happens in the operations of a casino operator,
Crown Casino in Melbourne, Victoria (Han-
cock, 2011). Violence in casino premises was
reported on levels that would be unacceptable
in many other businesses. The interviewees also
reported that gamblers frequently urinated or
even defecated on the floor, as they were not
willing to cease gambling activities in order to
visit the lavatory. It was customary to call a taxi
instead of an ambulance to avoid reporting to
the police and noting the casino context.
Patrons who were intoxicated were allowed to
gamble, even though this was against state law
in Victoria. Moreover, many of the Crown
Casino staff were inadequately equipped to
recognise and actually deal with situations
involving problem gambling: half of the inter-
viewees said that they would not bother to inter-
vene if they noticed an individual gambler
having personal issues unless he or she was
disturbing other patrons or the casino employ-
ees (Hancock, 2011). Given that Crown Casino
is the largest casino in the southern hemisphere
and operates in a highly regulated environment,
the case described above indicates that reliance
on self-regulation by the industry together with
responsible gambling policies may not be
enough to ensure the effective prevention of
gambling-related harm.
Reasons for and against individual
licensing
The implementation of an effective pre-
commitment system is difficult if it is possible
to continue gambling in other forms. One
advantage of licensing is that it might make it
easier to follow money flows. Currently it
seems that private profits are on the rise and
public profits are decreasing. For example,
founder and CEO of the UK-based Bet365
Denise Coates paid herself GBP 217 million
in the fiscal year 2016–2017, and was Britain’s
highest-paid executive during the period.
Although she claims that her salary is “a fair
recognition” of the growth of Bet365, critics
point out that it is 22 times as much as the
whole gambling industry donates annually to
the treatment of problem gambling in the UK
(Neate, 2017). Concerns about working condi-
tions in betting companies have also been raised
in the UK (Lamont, 2016). In the state of Tas-
mania in Australia, in turn, the same operator
(Federal Hotels) owned by one family (the Far-
rell family) has been allowed to run gambling
activities for 21 years, earning AUD 463 mil-
lion during that time (Minshull, 2018). The pro-
cess by which the license was given to one
company in the most disadvantaged state in
Australia was not very transparent, and politi-
cians may not have understood how much rev-
enue would be diverted from public use (Boyce,
2017). Given that up to 60% of gambling profits
derive from problem gamblers (Schull, 2012),
licensing might allow governments to see
where the profits are coming from and whether
the cost of harm is externalised to other juris-
dictions (through the more efficient recognition
of gamblers). It would also enhance the chan-
nelling of funds to domestic rather than foreign
and possibly illegal operators if banks and
financial institutions were required to check the
validity of licences when payments were made.
Preventing winnings being paid to unlicensed
players would discourage individual gamblers
from using foreign gambling sites.
Introducing individual licensing might be
one more step towards the effective prevention
of gambling problems, especially in counties in
which there is a national gambling monopoly,
including Nordic countries such as Finland and
Norway. Electronic identity cards have not
gained popularity in Finland: their use is not
obligatory, and online identification tends to
rely on online bank service codes. However,
given that Veikkaus in Finland has issued over
1.8 million loyalty cards, and that a special card
is required to gamble in Norway, it should be
possible to combine identification and
gambling-loyalty cards. Private operators
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would probably be more resistant to mandatory
pre-commitment in other contexts, such as Aus-
tralia, the UK and the USA (Blaszczynski,
Parke, Parke, & Rigbye, 2014), although even
in these countries gamblers would benefit from
having more effective pre-commitment systems
because they reduce the attractiveness of risk-
taking (Brevers et al., 2016). Currently, gam-
blers are able to set high limits and to establish a
buffer in terms of whether to continue gambling
(Gainsbury & Blaszczynski, 2012). Only
deposit limits have proved to be effective, at
least to some extent, as a means of pre-
commitment in voluntary systems (Haefli,
Lischer, & Schwartz, 2011). There is thus a
clear need for a more comprehensive pre-
commitment system in contexts in which gam-
bling is in the hands of private operators, one
that is not based on voluntary self-exclusion.
Problem gamblers could easily circumvent any
operator-based limitations. EGM gambling lim-
its, in particular, may be set and then exceeded
after a pause in the play unless the system is
applied as effectively as in Norway. However,
even in Norway it is unclear how much is
gambled on other platforms and abroad (Harris
& Griffiths, 2017). It would nevertheless be
possible to control this form of gambling, too,
by means of individual licensing combined
with effective payment and/or IP-blocking, as
long as there was the political will to do so. It is
true that government interventions are frowned
upon in many liberal democracies, but as in the
case of tobacco, harm to others (passive smok-
ing) eventually paved the way for more effec-
tive restrictions and regulation. Laws also
restrict the use of alcohol and drugs.
Aside from the above arguments, however,
one has to admit that the gravest concerns about
introducing individual gambling licences tend
to relate to privacy and the restriction of indi-
vidual freedom. This also applies to the notion
of pre-commitment (Gainsbury, Jakob, & Aro,
2018). The freedom of the majority tends to
outweigh the damage to the minority, and gov-
ernments should restrict gambling only if it
causes harm to others or damages one’s health.
In this context, the reasoning of J. S. Mill
(1806–1873) has been invoked (e.g., Collins,
2003, 2010). Using Mill as a reference in the
specific context of gambling is somewhat pro-
blematic: he published an article in the medical
journal The Lancet under the title “Effects of
gambling” in which he stated, “[t]here is no
practice capable of being pointed out, which
so entirely roots out all good habits and plants
in the stead so many bad ones” (quoted in Mill,
1823, p. 215; Collins, 2010 also notes that Mill
regarded gambling as a vice). It has also been
pointed out (Wolff, 2011) that if Mill’s concept
of liberty were applied comprehensively to
gambling, governments would not have the
right to regulate the practice more heavily than
it regulated other activities (Nikkinen & Mar-
ionneau, 2014; Wolff, 2011; see also McMillen,
2006, which is a thorough review of Collins,
2003).
It is unclear, however, how requiring a
licence to gamble would limit the rights of or
cause harm to those who are able to carry the
costs of gambling. Many such gamblers in Fin-
land already use a personal loyalty card, which
links to personal bank-account information.
Those who gamble with Norsk Tipping in Nor-
way use a card combined with a personal ID
and electronic payment system. Licensing
would facilitate evaluation of whether or not
social assistance and support are given in vain.
Social-assistance schemes have been created in
liberal welfare states to provide for basic needs
such as food, shelter, education and clothing.
Gambling may impose an unnecessary burden
on those relying on public assistance or who are
behind with their child-support payments
(Morse & Goss, 2010). One objection to this
kind of monitoring might be that it could have
a stigmatising effect on those who use social
assistance for gambling (Bogart, 2011). A
potential benefit, however, is that the costs
of gambling could be shown, with a view to
avoiding the unnecessary circulation of money
that does not necessarily produce much value
in itself. If it was a matter of merely transfer-
ring social-security payments to gambling
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companies, one could question the meaning-
fulness of funding “good causes” in such a
manner. As the Australian Productivity Com-
mission noted in 1999, people could support
causes they deemed worthwhile directly, with-
out using gambling as a medium (Productivity
Commission, 1999).
The costs of gambling could also be inter-
nalised within the gambling community, and
thus not transferred so easily to others. Cur-
rently in the US it is lucrative to establish a
casino or other gambling venue on the state
border to cater for gamblers from neighbouring
states, and thus to externalise the cost. Further,
incurring personal debt by taking instant loans
to provide funds for gambling could be made
more complicated if lenders were required to
check that the person had a gambling licence.
It has been found in the US that bankruptcies
increase sharply nine years after a casino has
been introduced in a neighbourhood (Morse &
Goss, 2010). It is unclear why society needs to
support the (private) gambling industry such
that profits are made from those who are the
most vulnerable (see the above examples from
the UK in relation to Bet365 and from Tasma-
nia in Australia). A relationship between gam-
bling and debt has already been established
both in academic research and in the grey liter-
ature produced by organisations providing debt
counselling (Barnard et al., 2014; Downs &
Woolrych, 2010; FCA, 2015; Heiskanen,
2017). Moreover, the need for more effective
preventive policies has been highlighted in the
context of bankruptcy and gambling debt
(Duns, 2007). Finally, licences could be
revoked in cases of gambling-motivated fraud,
which is also a recognised problem in work-
places (Binde, 2016; Warfield & Associates,
2016).
Conclusions
It seems that current pre-commitment systems
do not offer enough protection to problem gam-
blers. Either the tools are not used by gamblers
or they are ineffective. Even if operators have
responsible gambling policies in place, in prac-
tice they may fail to implement them properly
(the case of Crown Casino in Melbourne). The
benefits of licensing individual gamblers would
include the possibility of educating them
beforehand on the odds of gambling: there are
many misconceptions about the odds of win-
ning, especially with regard to EGM gambling.
The fact that licences would only be issued to
adults would reduce the need for age verifica-
tion in the venue. This would further curb
underage gambling and diminish the interest
of gambling operators in targeting their adver-
tising towards those under the legal gambling
age.
It is true that individual licensing would not
prevent all gambling-related harm, just as the
driving licence does not fully prevent accidents
and reckless driving (Bogart, 2011). Neverthe-
less, on the assumption that gambling inevita-
bly causes harm and related social costs,
requiring a licence would not be overregulation.
One benefit for operators if the licence covered
all gambling (including EGMs, lotteries and
casinos) would be that individual gambling
venues would not have the sole responsibility
for controlling customers who have requested
self-exclusion, which is both costly and time-
consuming, and unreliable if the person chooses
to try to circumvent the rules.
The fact that pre-commitment cards and
customer-loyalty programmes (including the
technologies necessary to run them) are already
in place and are working in most of Nordic
countries favours the trialling of licensed gam-
bling in the region. In Finland the majority of
the adult gambling population already use loy-
alty cards, and obligatory identification of gam-
blers is proposed, starting in 2021. The
obligatory registration of gamblers has been in
place in Sweden since 2014. In Norway, restric-
tions on gambling availability have proved
effective in curbing EGM-related harm in par-
ticular, at least measured by the number of help-
line calls (Rossow & Hansen 2016).
Introducing a personal licence does not neces-
sarily diminish profits: Norsk Tipping profits,
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for example, have remained relatively stable
(Norsk Tipping, 2018). Norsk Rikstoto (tote
betting) will also impose a mandatory loss limit
in January 2019. Together with the measures
that Norsk Tipping introduced earlier, this
could further pave the way for more effective
pre-commitment and licensing in the future.
If effective harm prevention were politically
feasible, this kind of licensing would ensure
that gambling was channelled to government-
sanctioned operators. Requiring banks and
financial institutions to check the licences of
customers before paying winnings into their
accounts would reduce the incidence of money
laundering. Currently in Finland, for example,
there is no obligation for casinos to give a
receipt for winnings under 1,000 Euros. As a
result, financial transactions cannot be con-
trolled efficiently, and it is difficult for banks
to assess whether the money in question is gen-
uinely related to gambling, or to other activi-
ties. The licence would thus also help the
government to control payments.
Offshore and illegal gambling operators
would not be able to access licensed customers
if the financial institutions paying out the win-
nings required the possession of a licence on
behalf of the customer. Less and less cash is
used for gambling nowadays, and many gam-
blers already rely on cards. The technology
needed for individual licensing is already in
place. Societies should promote the good of all
their citizens (Jordan, 1989): however, in
encouraging gambling a society may jeopardise
the well-being of some of its members (Adams,
2008; Nikkinen & Marionneau, 2014; Orford,
2011). The individual licence would be one step
forward in the more effective prevention of
harm, placing a fence on the top of the cliff
instead of an ambulance at the bottom (Mark-
ham & Young, 2013).
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